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APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Rules 3(a) and 4(a) of the Utah Court Of Appeals confer Jurisdiction 
upon this court to hear this Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an Appeal from a Decree Of Divorce and Judgment entered 
January 30, 1989 by the Honorable Raymond s. Uno, one of the Judges of 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTS^ UPON APPEAL 
This Appeal raises the following issues: 
1. Was the child visitation granted to Appellant proper? 
2. Is the amount of child support awarded to Respondent excessive? 
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3. Was the Restraining Order against Appellant proper? 
4. Was the requirement that Appellant provide life insurance 
proper? 
5. Was the award of the entirety of the real property to 
Respondent proper? 
6. Was the award of $294.72 of Appellant's monthly retirement 
benefits to Respondent proper? 
7. Was the awarding of $1,500.00 attorney fees and $82.00 costs of 
Court from Appellant to Respondent proper? 
8. Was the award of a Judgment in the amount of $1,100.72 against 
appellant and in favor of Respondent proper? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was born March 15, 1934. Respondent was born March 4, 
1938. Appellant and Respondent were married June 21, 1957 and 
separated August 9, 1986. KAYLENE HURST, the only natural born child 
of Appellant and Respondent, was born May 15, 1978. Respondent began 
the divorce action August 13, 1987. 
Appellant was employed at Kennecott Copper Corporation from 
September, 1956 until the Kennecott Copper layoff on April 1, 1985. On 
January 1, 1985, Appellant began receiving monthly Kennecott Copper 
pension in the sum of $454.41, which amount included a monthly 
reduction of $50.50 from pension benefits to provide for a $249.98 
monthly benefit payable to Respondent upon Appellant's death, but did 
not include a monthly supplemental sura of $300.00, payable to Appellant 
until Appellant's attainment of the age of 62, or until Appellant 
receives an unreduced Social Security Award, which ever occurs first. 
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The total monthly sums being received by Appellant from Kennecott 
Copper pension and supplement is $754.51, before taxes. (R 119). 
At the commencement of the divorce action, and continuing through 
date of trial, Appellant and Respondent were employed at Newspaper 
Agency Corporation. Appellant, at the time of trial, worked six (6) 
hours per day, six (6) days per week and was paid $5.05 per hour or 
$30.30 per day. (TR. 19). Respondent claimed a gross monthly income of 
$1,119.00. (R 84)• 
At trial, Appellant and Respondent stipulated that Respondent would 
have custody of the minor daughter, KAYLENE HURST, and that Appellant's 
visitation with KAYLENE would be under the direction and supervision of 
Judith Pugh of Intermountain Sexual Abuse Treatment Center. (TR. 4 and 
21). 
The major marital asset is the family residence which was free of 
encumbrances and which Appellant and Respondent stipulated, at trial, 
to have a value of $37,000.00. (TR. 6 and 7 ) . 
The trial Court, at the conclusion of the trial, made no independent 
Findings Of Pact and Conclusions Of Law relating to the following 
matters: 
(a) Appellant's visitation with KAYLENE HURST, beyond the 
Stipulation of Appellant and Respondent. 
(b) Child support. 
(c) Maintenance of life insurance* 
(d) Division of the family residence between Appellant and 
Respondent. 
(e) Division of Appellant's retirement benefits. 
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(f) The award of attorney's fees of $1,500.00 and costs of 
$82.00 to Respondent from Appellant. 
(g) The Judgment of $1,100.70 against Appellant in favor of 
Respondent. 
The trial Court, clearly allowed Respondent's attorney to substitute 
his (Respondent's attorney) judgments for those of the Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT T 
WAS APPELLANT'S VISITATION 
WITH KAYLENE HORST BEYOND THE 
STIPULATION OF APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT 
Appellant and Respondent Stipulated that Judith Pugh would supervise 
Appellant's visitation with KAYLENE HORST and that such supervised 
visitation would continue until further recommendations were made by 
Judith Pugh. (TR. 4 and 21). In Title 30 Chapter 3 Section 4, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, it is provided that "The Court or the 
Commissioner in all divorce cases shall make and file findings and 
decree upon the evidence." In the instant case, the record is barren 
of any evidence to support the restraints placed upon Appellant as 
stated in Paragraph 46 of the Findings Of Fact (R 325) and Paragraph 2 
of the Decree Of Divorce. (R 331). 
The Findings Of Fact placing restraints upon Appellant's visitation 
was clearly erroneous and supported by no evidence and requires 
reversal of the trial Court. Jefferies vs. Jefferies, 752 Pa2d 909. 
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POINT II 
WAS THE TRIAL COURT'S ASSESSMENT 
OF THE APPELLANT'S CHILD SUPPORT 
PROPER 
The trial Court left the matter of child support to be resolved* 
(TR. 23 and 24). The matter was never resolved between counsel and by 
confirmation from the Director Of Human Resources as suggested by the 
Court• But, Appellant's child support obligation of $205.00 per month 
was found, based upon Appellant's unsubstantiated gross income of 
$1,371.91 per month and Respondent's likewise unsubstantiated gross 
income of $1,413.72 per month. No evidence appears that the trial 
Court paid any mind to the provisions of Title 78 Chapter 45 Section 7, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and the amount of child support 
set by the trial Court should be set aside. Bake vs. Bake, 772 Pa2d 
461. 
POINT III 
WAS THE REQUIREMENT THAT 
APPELLANT PROVIDE LIFE INSURANCE 
APPROPRIATE 
The matter of Appellant's life insurance was a subject of discussion 
at trial. (TR. 14 and 15). No mention was made of Appellant's life 
insurance at the time of commencement of the divorce action and the 
only mention of insurance by the Court was in reference to medical 
insurance. (TR. 23 and 24). 
Findings Of Fact, Paragraph 55 (R 328), deals with the matter of 
Appellant's life insurance. No evidence was adduced at trial as to 
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what life insurance Appellant did or did not have - only the life 
insurance available to Appellant in connection with his employment. 
Paragraph 55 of the Findings Of Fact, signed by the court, and 
appearing in Paragraph 8 of the Decree Of' Divorce and Judgment is not 
supported by the evidence and should be stricken. 
POINT IV 
WAS THE AWARD OF THE FAMILY 
RESIDENCE IN ITS ENTIRETY TO RESPONDENT 
APPROPRIATE 
Appellant and Respondent Stipulated that the family residence had a 
value of $37,000.00.. (TR. 6 and 7). tfo mention was made at trial by 
the Court as to disposition of the family residence. In the Findings 
Of Fact, Paragraph 25 (R 320 and 321), the Court awarded the entirety 
of the family residence to Respondent, with the qualifying language, 
"and that such award be set off from any award of marital property 
being awarded to Defendant." Where the Appellant (Defendant) received 
a "set off from an award of marital property" (emphasis added) is a 
mystery to this writer; however, the number manipulating relating to 
Appellant's pension benefits appearing in Findings Of Fact, Paragraphs 
7 through 20 (R 316 to 320), would seem to contain the clues to the 
mystery. 
In making a division of marital property in a divorce proceeding, 
the trial Court is governed by general principles of equity. Title 30 
Chapter 3 Section 5, Utah Code Annotatedr 1953, as amended, Land vs. 
Land, 605 Pa2d 1248. This writer submits that there is no semblance of 
equity in the awarding of a $37,000.00 asset to the Respondent and no 
part of that asset to the Appellant. 
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POINT V 
WAS THE TRIAL COURTS 
DIVISION OP APPELLANTS 
RETIREMENT BENEFITS PROPER 
At trial, the court was silent as to a division of Appellant's 
retirement benefits. Proffer was made as to what this testimony of one 
Charles E. Peterson, Respondent's witness, would be, namely that 
Appellant's pension plan would have a future value of $81,042.00, the 
post-retirement spouse allowance would have a present value of 
$3,072.00, the present value of future flow of pension benefits to 
Appellant would be $76,328.00 and that Appellant received pension 
amounts between August 9, 1986 (date of separation of Appellant and 
Respondent) and September 26, 1988 (date of trial) in the total amount 
of $19,617.00 but increased to $21,343.00 with an 8% interest factor 
added. (TR. 4 and 5). With all deference to Mr. Peterson, the 
foregoing figures are senseless as socks on a rooster when one applies 
a little common sense to undisputed facts. 
Simply stated, Appellant's monthly, before taxes, pension amounts to 
$454.51 and is supplemented by an additional $300.00 until Appellant 
attains the age of 62 on March 15, 1998, or to such date as Appellant 
receives an unreduced Social Security Award, if received before 
Appellant's 62nd birthday. Appellant is going to live until he dies 
and Respondent is going to live until she dies in spite of all of the 
fancy charts and table of Charles E. Peterson^ Appellant's monthly 
pension is no different than a monthly paycheck of $454.51, with taxes 
deducted. A pension being considered as marital property (Woodward vs. 
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Woodward, 656 Pa2d 431), a portion of Appellant's monthly pension 
benefits should be considered as an entitlement of Respondent* 
Pension payments received by Appellant from date of separation to 
date of trial should not be considered a marital asset to be divided in 
that there was absolutely no evidence presented to the Court that this 
income was hidden and not accounted for by Appellant, Johnson vs. 
Johnson, 771 Pa2d 696. 
POINT VI 
WAS AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S 
PEES AND COSTS TO RESPONDENT 
PROPER 
No mention of Respondent's Attorney's fees and costs of court 
appears in the trial transcript but nevertheless Attorney's fees of 
$1,500.00 and Court costs of $82.00 were included in The Findings Of 
Factf Paragraphs 56 and 57. (TR. 328 and 329). 
In the case of Sorensen vs. Sorensen, 769 Pa2d 820, this Court, at 
page 832, set forth the requirements for recovery of attorney fees in a 
divorce action, none of which appear in the trial transcript of this 
case, and Respondent's need being most noticeably absent from the 
Findings Of Fact. (R 328 and 329). 
Concerning the matter of Respondent's costs, Rule 54(d)(2), Utah 
Rule Of Civil Procedure, provides the method of recovering costs by a 
party claiming costs. This method is by filing and serving a 
memorandum of costs, which was never done by Respondent in the case 
before this Court, and Respondent should be denied recovery of costs of 
Court* 
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POINT VII 
WAS JUDGMENT OF $1,100.70 
AGAINST APPELLANT PROPER 
The trial transcript makes no mention of the Court's determination 
of any portion of Appellant's pension benefits to which Respondent was 
entitled nor was mention made of when payment was to begin. Paragraph 
41 of the Findings Of Fact states $1,100.70 is due Respondent for the 
months of October, 1988 through January, 1989. (R 324). But, in 
granting Respondent a Decree Of Divorce, the Court, referring to the 
Decree Of Divorce, stated, "and become effective upon entering." (TR» 
24). For the reasons that the Decree Of Divorce and Judgment was not 
entered until January 30, 1989 (R 330 and 336) and that Paragraph 41 of 
the Findings Of Fact was not supported by the evidence, the Judgment of 
$1,100.70 against Appellant should be set aside. 
CONCLOSION 
This Court, in the exercise of its equity powers conferred by 
Graziano vs. Graziano, 7 Utah 2d 1987, 321 Pa2d 931, in the review of 
this case, should substitute its Judgment for the Judgments of the 
trial Court in allowing the inequity of a Decree Of Divorce and 
Judgment as to child visitation restraints, child support, life 
insurance, property division, attorney fees and costs place undue 
destruction and hardship upon Appellant, LARRY W. HURST. Costs should 
be awarded to Appellant. 
9 
Respectfully submitted/ 
^gi^c 
CDN BLACKHAM 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
3535 South 3200 West Street 
West Valley City/ Utah 84119 
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